? by-ref-203846-5.patch ? check-POST-222588-1.patch ? check-POST-222588-3.patch ? improve-drupal_to_js-222578-2.patch ? phpass-29706-162.patch ? phpass-29706-162a.patch ? phpass-29706-162b.patch ? phpass.patch ? real-clone.patch ? remove-drupal_to_js.patch ? revert-by-ref-203846-18.patch ? sites/default/files ? sites/default/settings.php Index: includes/passwordhash.inc =================================================================== RCS file: includes/passwordhash.inc diff -N includes/passwordhash.inc --- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000 +++ includes/passwordhash.inc 20 Feb 2008 04:14:01 -0000 @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ + in 2004-2006 and placed in +# the public domain. +# +# There's absolutely no warranty. +# +# The homepage URL for this framework is: +# +# http://www.openwall.com/phpass/ +# +# Please be sure to update the Version line if you edit this file in any way. +# It is suggested that you leave the main version number intact, but indicate +# your project name (after the slash) and add your own revision information. +# +# Please do not change the "private" password hashing method implemented in +# here, thereby making your hashes incompatible. However, if you must, please +# change the hash type identifier (the "$P$") to something different. +# +# Obviously, since this code is in the public domain, the above are not +# requirements (there can be none), but merely suggestions. +# +class PasswordHash { + var $itoa64; + var $iteration_count_log2; + var $portable_hashes; + var $random_state; + + function PasswordHash($iteration_count_log2, $portable_hashes) + { + $this->itoa64 = './0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; + + if ($iteration_count_log2 < 4 || $iteration_count_log2 > 31) + $iteration_count_log2 = 8; + $this->iteration_count_log2 = $iteration_count_log2; + + $this->portable_hashes = $portable_hashes; + + $this->random_state = microtime() . getmypid(); + } + + function get_random_bytes($count) + { + $output = ''; + if (($fh = @fopen('/dev/urandom', 'rb'))) { + $output = fread($fh, $count); + fclose($fh); + } + + if (strlen($output) < $count) { + $output = ''; + for ($i = 0; $i < $count; $i += 16) { + $this->random_state = + md5(microtime() . $this->random_state); + $output .= + pack('H*', md5($this->random_state)); + } + $output = substr($output, 0, $count); + } + + return $output; + } + + function encode64($input, $count) + { + $output = ''; + $i = 0; + do { + $value = ord($input[$i++]); + $output .= $this->itoa64[$value & 0x3f]; + if ($i < $count) + $value |= ord($input[$i]) << 8; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 6) & 0x3f]; + if ($i++ >= $count) + break; + if ($i < $count) + $value |= ord($input[$i]) << 16; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 12) & 0x3f]; + if ($i++ >= $count) + break; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 18) & 0x3f]; + } while ($i < $count); + + return $output; + } + + function gensalt_private($input) + { + $output = '$P$'; + $output .= $this->itoa64[min($this->iteration_count_log2 + + ((PHP_VERSION >= '5') ? 5 : 3), 30)]; + $output .= $this->encode64($input, 6); + + return $output; + } + + function crypt_private($password, $setting) + { + $output = '*0'; + if (substr($setting, 0, 2) == $output) + $output = '*1'; + + if (substr($setting, 0, 3) != '$P$') + return $output; + + $count_log2 = strpos($this->itoa64, $setting[3]); + if ($count_log2 < 7 || $count_log2 > 30) + return $output; + + $count = 1 << $count_log2; + + $salt = substr($setting, 4, 8); + if (strlen($salt) != 8) + return $output; + + # We're kind of forced to use MD5 here since it's the only + # cryptographic primitive available in all versions of PHP + # currently in use. To implement our own low-level crypto + # in PHP would result in much worse performance and + # consequently in lower iteration counts and hashes that are + # quicker to crack (by non-PHP code). + if (PHP_VERSION >= '5') { + $hash = md5($salt . $password, TRUE); + do { + $hash = md5($hash . $password, TRUE); + } while (--$count); + } else { + $hash = pack('H*', md5($salt . $password)); + do { + $hash = pack('H*', md5($hash . $password)); + } while (--$count); + } + + $output = substr($setting, 0, 12); + $output .= $this->encode64($hash, 16); + + return $output; + } + + function gensalt_extended($input) + { + $count_log2 = min($this->iteration_count_log2 + 8, 24); + # This should be odd to not reveal weak DES keys, and the + # maximum valid value is (2**24 - 1) which is odd anyway. + $count = (1 << $count_log2) - 1; + + $output = '_'; + $output .= $this->itoa64[$count & 0x3f]; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 6) & 0x3f]; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 12) & 0x3f]; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 18) & 0x3f]; + + $output .= $this->encode64($input, 3); + + return $output; + } + + function gensalt_blowfish($input) + { + # This one needs to use a different order of characters and a + # different encoding scheme from the one in encode64() above. + # We care because the last character in our encoded string will + # only represent 2 bits. While two known implementations of + # bcrypt will happily accept and correct a salt string which + # has the 4 unused bits set to non-zero, we do not want to take + # chances and we also do not want to waste an additional byte + # of entropy. + $itoa64 = './ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789'; + + $output = '$2a$'; + $output .= chr(ord('0') + $this->iteration_count_log2 / 10); + $output .= chr(ord('0') + $this->iteration_count_log2 % 10); + $output .= '$'; + + $i = 0; + do { + $c1 = ord($input[$i++]); + $output .= $itoa64[$c1 >> 2]; + $c1 = ($c1 & 0x03) << 4; + if ($i >= 16) { + $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; + break; + } + + $c2 = ord($input[$i++]); + $c1 |= $c2 >> 4; + $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; + $c1 = ($c2 & 0x0f) << 2; + + $c2 = ord($input[$i++]); + $c1 |= $c2 >> 6; + $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; + $output .= $itoa64[$c2 & 0x3f]; + } while (1); + + return $output; + } + + function HashPassword($password) + { + $random = ''; + + if (CRYPT_BLOWFISH == 1 && !$this->portable_hashes) { + $random = $this->get_random_bytes(16); + $hash = + crypt($password, $this->gensalt_blowfish($random)); + if (strlen($hash) == 60) + return $hash; + } + + if (CRYPT_EXT_DES == 1 && !$this->portable_hashes) { + if (strlen($random) < 3) + $random = $this->get_random_bytes(3); + $hash = + crypt($password, $this->gensalt_extended($random)); + if (strlen($hash) == 20) + return $hash; + } + + if (strlen($random) < 6) + $random = $this->get_random_bytes(6); + $hash = + $this->crypt_private($password, + $this->gensalt_private($random)); + if (strlen($hash) == 34) + return $hash; + + # Returning '*' on error is safe here, but would _not_ be safe + # in a crypt(3)-like function used _both_ for generating new + # hashes and for validating passwords against existing hashes. + return '*'; + } + + function CheckPassword($password, $stored_hash) + { + $hash = $this->crypt_private($password, $stored_hash); + if ($hash[0] == '*') + $hash = crypt($password, $stored_hash); + + return $hash == $stored_hash; + } +} + +/** + * Hash a password using a secure hash. + * + * @param $password + * A plain-text password + * + * @return + * A string containing the hashed password (and a salt). + */ +function user_hash_password($password) { + $ph = new PasswordHash(8, TRUE); + return $ph->HashPassword($password); +} + +/** + * Check whether a plain text password matches a stored hash. + * + * @param $password + * A plain-text password + * @param $stored_hash + * A stored hash + * + * @return + * TRUE or FALSE. + */ +function user_check_password($password, $stored_hash) { + $ph = new PasswordHash(8, TRUE); + return $ph->CheckPassword($password, $stored_hash); +} Index: modules/system/system.install =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/drupal/drupal/modules/system/system.install,v retrieving revision 1.238 diff -u -p -r1.238 system.install --- modules/system/system.install 30 Jan 2008 20:30:35 -0000 1.238 +++ modules/system/system.install 20 Feb 2008 04:14:01 -0000 @@ -2471,3 +2471,27 @@ function system_update_6047() { * @} End of "defgroup updates-5.x-to-6.x" * The next series of updates should start at 7000. */ + +/** + * @defgroup updates-6.x-to-7.x System updates from 6.x to 7.x + * @{ + */ + +/** + * Increase the length of the password field to accomodate better hashes. + * + * Also re-hashes all current passwords with {users}.init as a salt. This + * provides a modest immediate improvement in security. + */ +function system_update_7000() { + $ret = array(); + db_change_field($ret, 'users', 'pass', 'pass', array('type' => 'varchar', 'length' => 128, 'not null' => TRUE, 'default' => '')); + // Rehash with a salt all current hashes + $ret[] = update_sql("UPDATE {users} SET pass = MD5(CONCAT(init, pass)) WHERE uid > 0"); + return $ret; +} + +/** + * @} End of "defgroup updates-6.x-to-7.x" + * The next series of updates should start at 8000. + */ Index: modules/user/user.install =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/drupal/drupal/modules/user/user.install,v retrieving revision 1.6 diff -u -p -r1.6 user.install --- modules/user/user.install 18 Feb 2008 16:53:36 -0000 1.6 +++ modules/user/user.install 20 Feb 2008 04:14:01 -0000 @@ -144,10 +144,10 @@ function user_schema() { ), 'pass' => array( 'type' => 'varchar', - 'length' => 32, + 'length' => 128, 'not null' => TRUE, 'default' => '', - 'description' => t("User's password (md5 hash)."), + 'description' => t("User's password (hashed)."), ), 'mail' => array( 'type' => 'varchar', Index: modules/user/user.module =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/drupal/drupal/modules/user/user.module,v retrieving revision 1.895 diff -u -p -r1.895 user.module --- modules/user/user.module 18 Feb 2008 19:34:08 -0000 1.895 +++ modules/user/user.module 20 Feb 2008 04:14:02 -0000 @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ function user_load($array = array()) { } else if ($key == 'pass') { $query[] = "pass = '%s'"; - $params[] = md5($value); + $params[] = $value; } else { $query[]= "LOWER($key) = LOWER('%s')"; @@ -214,7 +214,9 @@ function user_save($account, $array = ar $user_fields = $table['fields']; if (!empty($array['pass'])) { - $array['pass'] = md5($array['pass']); + // Allow alternate hashing schemes + require_once variable_get('passwordhash.inc', './includes/passwordhash.inc'); + $array['pass'] = user_hash_password(trim($array['pass'])); } else { // Avoid overwriting an existing password with a blank password. @@ -1278,12 +1280,34 @@ function user_login_final_validate($form function user_authenticate($form_values = array()) { global $user; + $password = trim($form_values['pass']); // Name and pass keys are required. - if (!empty($form_values['name']) && !empty($form_values['pass']) && - $account = user_load(array('name' => $form_values['name'], 'pass' => trim($form_values['pass']), 'status' => 1))) { - $user = $account; - user_authenticate_finalize($form_values); - return $user; + if (!empty($form_values['name']) && !empty($password)) { + $account = db_fetch_array(db_query("SELECT init, pass FROM {users} WHERE name = '%s'", $form_values['name'])); + if ($account && $account['pass']) { + $stored_hash = $account['pass']; + // Allow alternate hashing schemes + require_once variable_get('passwordhash.inc', './includes/passwordhash.inc'); + + if (strlen($stored_hash) <= 32) { + // Test for and update old MD5 hashes of passwords + $matched = ($stored_hash == md5($account['init'] . md5($password))); + if ($matched) { + $stored_hash = user_hash_password($password); + db_query("UPDATE {users} SET pass = '%s' WHERE name = '%s'", $stored_hash, $form_values['name']); + } + } + else { + $matched = user_check_password($password, $stored_hash); + } + + if ($account && $matched) { + $account = user_load(array('name' => $form_values['name'], 'pass' => $stored_hash, 'status' => 1)); + $user = $account; + user_authenticate_finalize($form_values); + return $user; + } + } } }